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LOST SOULS: CONSTITUTIONAL 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
DEFICIENCIES IN TREATMENT FOR 
PERSONS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS IN 
CUSTODY 
KATHERINE L. SMITH* 
INTRODUCTION 
The most recent study performed by the Justice Department’s 
Bureau of Justice Statistics revealed that over half of all persons in penal 
custody have some form of mental illness, while the rate of mental 
illness within the general population is closer to one in ten.1  This study 
also revealed that prison conditions for persons with mental health 
problems are quantifiably different than those for persons without mental 
problems.2  For example, inmates with mental illness are twice as likely 
* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, 
California; B.S. Environmental Science, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas.  I dedicate this 
Comment in memory of Courtney Willard, who was a constant source of inspiration throughout the 
publication process.  I wish to thank my grandmother, Lucille Kinkade, whose wisdom and 
unyielding support has been instrumental.  I wish to thank the members of Law Review, and 
particularly Jennie Culjat, who provided invaluable insight and feedback.  Most of all, I wish to 
thank my partner and keystone, Amber Mayfield, who was the inspiration for this Comment and 
whose love and encouragement are my source of strength. 
 1 DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH 
PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1, 3 (2006), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf. 
 2 See id. at 10. 
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to be injured in fights as compared to those without mental illness.3  
Furthermore, even though all federal prisons and most state prisons and 
jails now provide some form of mental health services to inmates,4 most 
inmates with mental illness never receive treatment while in custody.5  In 
fact, less than one quarter of federal inmates and one third of state 
inmates with mental health problems receive treatment for their mental 
illness.6  Since mental illness can be exacerbated by prison conditions, 
proper diagnosis and treatment are essential for the well-being of persons 
with mental illness in custody.7 
This Comment explores systemic deficiencies of access to mental 
health care in prison systems and the Eighth Amendment implications of 
those deficiencies.  Because the Eighth Amendment prohibits, among 
other things, infliction of cruel and unusual punishments, when denial of 
adequate mental health care results in undue suffering, the conditions of 
confinement may violate the Constitution.8  Therefore, there must be 
mechanisms in place to ensure necessary treatment is provided while 
protecting individual rights. 
Part I of this Comment addresses the duty a state owes to those it 
incarcerates (e.g., to provide food, clothing, recreation, education, 
medical care) and what standards exist for the provision of reasonable 
care and to ensure that prescribed care is in fact delivered.  Part I also 
summarizes the history of prisoners’ efforts to redress conditions of 
confinement and the standards that have developed for constitutional 
challenges.  Part II focuses on the legal framework for Eighth 
Amendment challenges brought by prisoners and how the standard for 
evaluating those claims has evolved.  Part III explores the problems 
persons with mental illness face in challenging the conditions of their 
confinement after Estelle v. Gamble,9 identifies the particular barriers to 
Eighth Amendment challenges for persons with mental health problems 
created by Farmer v. Brennan,10 and addresses the tension between 
 3 Id. (“A larger percentage of inmates who had a mental health problem had been injured in 
a fight since admission than those without a mental problem (State prisoners, 20% compared to 10%; 
Federal prisoners, 11% compared to 6%; jail inmates, 9% compared to 3%).”). 
 4 Id. at 9. 
 5 See id. 
 6 Id. (“State prisoners who had a mental health problem (34%) had the highest rate of mental 
health treatment since admission, followed by Federal prisoners (24%) and local jail inmates 
(17%).”). 
 7 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH 
MENTAL ILLNESS 1, 53 (2003), available at www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa1003.pdf. 
 8 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 9 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
 10 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). 
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providing mental health care to the incarcerated and the right to refuse 
treatment.  Part IV proposes three systemic changes, applicable to both 
prisons and the surrounding legal framework, that address the 
deficiencies and disparities in how the needs of inmates with mental 
health problems are managed. 
I.   HISTORY OF PRISONERS’ RIGHT TO CHALLENGE ASPECTS OF 
CONFINEMENT 
The Eighth Amendment establishes the constitutional limitations of 
imprisonment by prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment.11  When a 
person is incarcerated, the incarceration or punishment cannot be grossly 
disproportionate to the underlying offense.12  Gratuitous punishment, that 
which inflicts unnecessary pain and suffering on an inmate, or 
punishment that results in the deprivation of life violates the Eighth 
Amendment.13  However, the very nature of imprisonment necessitates 
conditions that are restrictive and even harsh; thus, conditions must be 
below societal standards of decency to raise constitutional concerns.14 
A.   STATES’ DUTY OF CARE TO INMATES 
Cruel and unusual punishment—as it relates to conditions of 
confinement—has evolved over the course of American history.15  
Throughout American history, legislatures and courts have affirmed that 
persons in state custody must be provided basic necessities.16  Courts 
have long held that inmates, whose confinement and resulting 
deprivation of liberty prevent them from caring for themselves, are to be 
 11 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 12 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) (“[I]t is a precept of justice that 
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense.”). 
 13 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978); Bowring v. 
Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977) (citing Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F.2d 1072, 1076 (6th Cir. 
1972)) (U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, makes Eighth Amendment protections applicable to states); 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (“[P]unishment must not involve the unnecessary and 
wanton infliction of pain.”). 
 14 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Atiyeh v. Capps, 449 U.S. 1312, 1315-16 
(1981); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 305 (1991) (“Nothing so amorphous as ‘overall 
conditions’ can rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of a 
single human need exists.”). 
 15 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (“The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its 
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”). 
 16 See, e.g., Miller v. Cnty. of Dickinson, 26 N.W. 31, 32 (Iowa 1885) (“The prisoner being 
in the custody of the sheriff, it was the duty of the latter to supply him with the necessaries of life 
suitable to his condition . . . .”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:705 (Westlaw 2012) (originally enacted 
as LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2837, 3612 (1870)). 
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given basic necessities.17  In general, state laws dictated that food, 
clothing, and shelter must be supplied to prisoners in custody.18  Over 
time, the definition of necessities broadened to include protection from 
abuse and the provision of reasonable medical care.19  Since the late 
1800s, several courts have held that the state is obligated to make 
necessary medical treatment available, whether it be in public hospitals 
or in prisons.20  Medical care, as defined by lower courts, includes 
treatment for both physical and mental health, but the U.S. Supreme 
Court has not specifically addressed the issue of mental health care.21  
 17 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198-201 (1989); 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (citing Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (N.C. 
1926)). 
 18 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 14-6-19 (Westlaw 2011) (originally enacted as ALA. CODE § 243 
(1852)); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 33.30.011 (Westlaw 2012) (originally enacted as 1986 Alaska Sess. 
Laws, ch. 88, §6); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18-7 (Westlaw 2012) (originally enacted as CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3002 (1949)); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-5-2 (Westlaw 2012) (originally enacted as 
1956 Ga. Laws, No. 112, § 13, at 161, 171); IND. CODE ANN. § 11-10-3-2 (Westlaw 2012) 
(originally enacted as 1979 Ind. Acts, P.L. 120, ch. 3, at 487, 508); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:705 
(Westlaw 2012) (originally enacted as LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2837, 3612 (1870)); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 47-1-27(Westlaw 2012) (originally enacted as MISS. CODE ANN. § 4070 (1930)); MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 221.120 (Westlaw 2012) (originally enacted as MO. ANN. STAT. § 9223 (Westlaw 1939)); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-181 (Westlaw 2011) (originally enacted as 1969 Neb. Laws, ch. 817, § 12, at 
3071, 3079); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-B:4 (Westlaw 2012) (originally enacted as N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 89:1 (1988)); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 34-105 (Westlaw 2012) (originally enacted 
as 1987 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 80, § 10, at 308, 316); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169.076 (Westlaw 
2012) (originally enacted as 1979 Or. Laws, ch. 487, § 6, at 595, 596); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-1-105 
(Westlaw 2012) (originally enacted as 1890 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 37, § 5, at 166, 167). 
 19 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994) (“The Amendment also imposes duties 
on these officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure 
that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable 
measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’”) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 
(1984)); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31-32 (1993); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 
210, 225 (1990); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103; DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-99. 
 20 Miller, 26 N.W. at 32; Malone v. Escambia Cnty., 22 So. 503, 504-05 (Ala. 1897); Perkins 
v. Grafton Cnty., 29 A. 541, 541 (N.H. 1892); see also Williams v. Treen, 671 F.2d 892, 901 (5th 
Cir. 1982); Duncan v. Duckworth, 644 F.2d 653, 654 (7th Cir. 1981); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 
559, 574-75 (10th Cir. 1980); Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 286 (5th Cir. 1977) cert. granted 
in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978); Cruz v. Ward, 558 F.2d 658, 
661 (2d Cir. 1977); Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 318 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Runnels v. 
Rosendale, 499 F.2d 733, 736 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Blanks v. Cunningham, 409 F.2d 220, 
221 (4th Cir. 1969) (per curiam); Spicer, 132 S.E. at 293; City of Tulsa v. Hillcrest Med. Ctr., 292 
P.2d 430, 432 -33 (Okla. 1956). 
 21 See Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996); Bowring v. Godwin, 551 
F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977) (citing Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 
421 U.S. 948 (1975)).  But see Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011) (“Overcrowding has 
overtaken the limited resources of prison staff; imposed demands well beyond the capacity of 
medical and mental health facilities; and created unsanitary and unsafe conditions that make 
progress in the provision of care difficult or impossible to achieve. The overcrowding is the ‘primary 
cause of the violation of a Federal right,’ 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(i), specifically the severe and 
unlawful mistreatment of prisoners through grossly inadequate provision of medical and mental 
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The Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble formally confirmed that a 
person in custody must have all basic necessities furnished, including 
medical needs.22  However, courts are generally reluctant to hold that 
failure to provide adequate care rises to the level of cruel and unusual 
punishment.23 
The minimum standards for providing basic necessities have been 
refined over time, which evidences society’s evolving standards of 
decency.24  The standard for adequate medical care is based on 
professional judgment that meets minimal expectations of the applicable 
profession.25  For medical care, most illnesses, diseases and injuries are 
quantifiable and objectively diagnosable.26  However, when the 
diagnosis is subjective, doctors are given discretion unless their conduct 
is deemed malicious.27  Therefore, for persons with mental illness where 
the diagnoses are almost exclusively subjective,28 proving a failure to 
health care.”).  In Brown v. Plata, overcrowding was the dominant cause for several systemic Eighth 
Amendment violations, but the Court also alluded to mental health care. 
 22 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04 (“The infliction of such unnecessary suffering [by denying  
medical care] is inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency as manifested in modern 
legislation codifying the common-law view that ‘(i)t is but just that the public be required to care for 
the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself.’” (quoting 
Spicer, 132 S.E. at 293)). 
 23 See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (stating that Eighth Amendment is 
implicated by the “‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’” and not an “‘inadvertent failure to 
provide adequate medical care’” (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104, 105)); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 
(“In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful 
to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”); Talal v. White, 403 F.3d 423, 426 
(6th Cir. 2005) (requiring that the prisoner demonstrate more than “mere discomfort or 
inconvenience”); Bowring, 551 F.2d at 48; Haskew v. Wainwright, 429 F.2d 525, 526 (5th Cir. 
1970) (per curiam); see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981) (noting the scope of 
successful confinement challenges is limited to “deprivations of essential food, medical care, or 
sanitation” or “conditions intolerable for prison confinement”); Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 
867 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a 
substantial risk of serious harm.” (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834)); Wood v. Housewright, 900 
F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating there is no Eighth Amendment violation if the delay in 
treatment does not cause substantial harm); Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 
762 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 24 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
 25 See, e.g., McKee-Bey v. Mitchell, 259 F. App’x 880, 883 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating prisoners 
are entitled to minimal expectations of a doctor’s profession, and no constitutional violation exists if 
the doctor has met this minimum standard of medical care); Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 
903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[A]s long as a physician exercises professional judgment his 
behavior will not violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights.”). 
 26 See, e.g., Robert A. Aronowitz, When Do Symptoms Become a Disease?, 134 ANNALS 
INTERNAL MED. 803, 803 (2001). 
 27 See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (“When prison officials maliciously and 
sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated.”). 
 28 Mary Boyle, The Problem with Diagnosis, 20 PSYCHOLOGIST 290, 290 (2007). 
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diagnose and treat illness requires a more exacting standard than for 
failure to treat objectively discernible physical ailments. 
Although prisoners have challenged everything from the type of 
food served to inadequate hygiene care,29 the standards that courts have 
imposed on prisons for providing essential care are implemented only 
when there are systemic deficiencies that have repeatedly failed to be 
mitigated.30  Traditionally, courts have deferred to prison institutions to 
create their own standards and to deal with challenges on an 
individualized basis.31  This deference was codified in the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995.32  In rare cases in which prisoners have 
successfully complained of systemic problems, courts have generally 
ordered plaintiffs and defendants to develop a remedial plan to address 
the constitutional violations.33 
B.   DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE CONSTITUTIONAL 
VIOLATIONS DURING CONFINEMENT 
Before the 1964 Supreme Court ruling in Cooper v. Pate,34 
prisoners had little recourse to challenge the conditions of their 
confinement,35 despite the Eight Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishment, because challenges were limited to the sentencing 
and punishment phase.36  In Cooper, an inmate made a novel challenge 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when he was denied access to Muslim reading 
 29 See, e.g., Flanory v. Bonn, 604 F.3d 249, 255 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding that denying a 
prisoner toothpaste for 337 days, resulting in gum disease and tooth extraction, “bespeaks an 
indifference to basic hygiene needs”); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 647 (E.D. Va. 1971) 
(evaluating a disciplinary bread-and-water diet and determining it to be “inconsistent with current 
minimum standards of respect for human dignity”). 
 30 See Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Peirce, 487 F. Supp. 638, 643 (W.D. Pa. 1980); 
Feliciano v. Barcelo, 497 F. Supp. 14, 33-35 (D.P.R. 1979). 
 31 See Haskew v. Wainwright, 429 F.2d 525, 526 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam). 
 32 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626 (Westlaw 2012). 
 33 See, e.g., Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1283 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Ruiz v. Estelle, 
503 F. Supp. 1265, 1390 (S.D. Tex. 1980), abrogated on other grounds by Carr v. Newcomer, No. 
09-1080, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 123559, at *22-23 (W.D. La. Dec. 21, 2009).  But see Feliciano, 497 
F. Supp. at 40 (where conditions were so unsanitary and dangerous to health and life, the court made 
an emergency order with detailed and specific remedial measures). 
 34 Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964). 
 35 See Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790, 796 (1871) (“The bill of rights is a declaration 
of general principles to govern a society of freemen, and not of convicted felons and men civilly 
dead.”). 
 36 Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1951) (“[I]t is well settled that it is not 
the function of the courts to superintend the treatment and discipline of prisoners in penitentiaries, 
but only to deliver from imprisonment those who are illegally confined.”); see also Sarshik v. 
Sanford, 142 F.2d 676, 676 (5th Cir. 1944) (per curiam); Kelly v. Dowd, 140 F.2d 81, 83 (7th Cir. 
1944). 
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material.37  Section 1983 provides that no person may, under color of 
law, deprive another person of constitutional rights and privileges.38  The 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted the 
defendant’s39 motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted, and the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit affirmed.40  However, the Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that the inmate’s allegations that prison officials denied him 
permission to purchase religious publications and denied other privileges 
enjoyed by other prisoners stated a viable cause of action.41  Although 
this was a challenge based on a violation of the First Amendment, it 
opened the door for challenges based on other constitutional violations 
occurring during confinement, including Eighth Amendment 
violations.42  This significant holding departed from prior decisions that 
limited a prisoner’s redress for Eighth Amendment violations to acts 
prior to confinem 43
Since Cooper, there have been scores of § 1983 claims alleging 
violations of the Eighth Amendment.44  Several of these cases exposed 
 37 Cooper alleged the warden and others “denied permission to purchase and read Arabic and 
Swahili grammar books, from which Cooper hopes to learn to read Islamic works in the original; 
have denied permission to purchase and read the Koran; have denied permission to consult with 
ministers of his faith; have refused to allow Cooper and other inmates of his faith to attend religious 
services in their faith.” Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518, 520 (7th Cir. 1967). 
 38 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Westlaw 2012) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or 
omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.  For the purposes of this 
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered 
to be a statute of the District of Columbia.”). 
 39 The defendant was the warden of the state penitentiary. 
 40 Cooper v. Pate, 324 F.2d 165, 166-67 (7th Cir. 1963); see Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 
546 (1964) (per curiam). 
 41 See Cooper, 378 U.S. at 546. 
 42 Section 1983 has also been used to address violations of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  See, e.g., Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (prison 
inmate labor union brought § 1983 claim against prison officials challenging regulations that 
prohibited inmates from soliciting other inmates to join the union as a violation of First Amendment 
rights); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976) (inmates alleged that procedures used in prison 
disciplinary proceedings violated their rights to due process and equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 43 See Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1951); Sarshik v. Sanford, 142 F.2d 
676, 676 (5th Cir. 1944); Kelly v. Dowd, 140 F.2d 81, 83 (7th Cir. 1944). 
 44 See, e.g., Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973); LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 
F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1972); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 261 n.14 (1973) (noting 
7
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conditions so deplorable that Congress enacted the Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons Act in 1976.45  This Act authorized the 
Attorney General to bring suits in federal court on behalf of persons 
institutionalized by the United States.46  The Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons Act and subsequent litigation resulted in 
dramatic improvements in prison conditions.47 
During this influx of § 1983 cases, the Supreme Court made 
significant holdings that affected the rights of prisoners with mental 
illness.  In Vitek v. Jones, the Court declared unconstitutional a state 
statute that permitted the prison director to transfer a prisoner to a mental 
hospital for involuntary commitment if a psychologist found the prisoner 
to be mentally ill and could not be properly treated in prison.48  The 
Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s holding, stating that the 
transfer was “qualitatively different” from the punishment for the crime 
and required additional due process protections to comply with the 
Fourteenth Amendment.49  Although grounded in due process, this case 
was important because the Court addressed the issue of persons with 
mental illness while in custody.  In Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged the common-law tradition that a prison owes a duty to 
provide medical care to those in custody and stated that failure to do so 
could “result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve 
any penological purpose.  The infliction of such unnecessary suffering is 
inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency . . . .”50 
While many cases advanced reform of prison conditions and many 
problems uncovered by prison litigation were addressed, the trend was 
not unidirectional because the courts became overwhelmed with prison 
civil rights prisoner petitions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 had tripled from 1,072 to 3,348 from 1968 to 
1973). 
 45 Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997 et seq. (Westlaw 2012). 
 46 Id. 
 47 The Conference Committee noted that, as a result of litigation in which the Justice 
Department had participated, “conditions have improved significantly in dozens of institutions 
across the Nation: . . . barbaric treatment of adult and juvenile prisoners has been curbed; . . . and 
States facing the prospect of suit by the Attorney General have voluntarily upgraded conditions in 
their institutions . . . to comply with previously announced constitutional standards.”  H.R. REP. NO. 
96-897, at 9 (1980) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.A.A.N. 787, 833. 
 48 Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980). 
 49 Id. at 493-94 (“A criminal conviction and sentence of imprisonment extinguish an 
individual’s right to freedom from confinement for the term of his sentence, but they do not 
authorize the State to classify him as mentally ill and to subject him to involuntary psychiatric 
treatment without affording him additional due process protections.”).  The due process protections 
included notice, a hearing before an independent decisionmaker, submission of evidence that formed 
the basis for the determination, and access to assistance for the prisoner.  Id. at 496-97. 
 50 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (citation omitted). 
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reform cases.51  Even though vindication of a prisoner’s constitutional 
rights based on conditions of confinement only became possible in the 
second half of the twentieth century, the ability to successfully challenge 
violations of these rights has since been limited by the Supreme Court 
and Congress. 
C.   CHANGING DIRECTION: FROM PROMOTING TO RESTRICTING 
PRISONER LITIGATION 
Within twenty years of providing prisoners a method for redress, the 
Supreme Court and Congress both acted to limit prisoner cases.52  The 
Supreme Court attempted to moderate the amount of prisoner cases in 
Turner v. Safley,53 by declaring, “[W]hen a prison regulation impinges 
on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably 
related to legitimate penological interests.”54  Turner was a significant 
turning point in prison litigation.  By adopting a rational-basis standard 
of review, the Supreme Court established that courts must show 
deference toward prison officials and policies when evaluating alleged 
constitutional violations.55  Nearly a decade after Turner, Congress also 
acted to curtail prison cases by passing the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995.56  This Act promotes Turner-style deference to the impact on 
operations when assessing violations, restricts the injunctive relief a 
court may grant for constitutional violations based on prison conditions, 
and requires that any relief given be as narrow as possible while still 
correcting the violation.57  Together, Turner and the Prison Litigation 
 51 See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1692 (2003) (indicating 
that before the passage of the Prison Reform Litigation Act suits brought by inmates outnumbered 
non-inmate suits). 
 52 The Court provided a method for redress via § 1983 with Cooper in 1964 and restricted 
redress in Turner v. Safley in 1987, whereas the legislature provided redress with the Civil Rights of 
Institutional Persons Act in 1976 and limited redress with the Prison Litigation Reform Act in 1995.  
See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626 (Westlaw 2012). 
 53 Turner, 482 U.S. 78. 
 54 Id. at 89. 
 55 Id. (“In our view, such a standard is necessary if ‘prison administrators . . . , and not the 
courts, [are] to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations.’” (quoting Jones v. 
N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977))). 
 56 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626 (Westlaw 2012). 
 57 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (Westlaw 2012) (“Prospective relief in any civil action with 
respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the 
Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs.  The court shall not grant or approve any 
prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than 
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to 
correct the violation of the Federal right.  The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse 
impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.”). 
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Reform Act created substantial impediments for prison condition 
challenges. 
II.   THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR EIGHTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES: 
THE ESTELLE TEST 
In addition to Turner and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the 
Court in Estelle v. Gamble established a standard with two distinct 
hurdles an inmate must overcome to prevail on an Eighth Amendment 
challenge.58  In Estelle, the Court created a two-part test to establish a 
cruel-and-unusual-punishment claim.  The test requires that (1) there has 
been a serious medical need, illness or injury, and (2) the defendant (state 
actor in claims brought under § 1983) has been deliberately indifferent.59 
Although the Supreme Court did not define “serious medical need,” 
several courts utilize the definition provided by the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Monmouth County Correctional 
Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro.60  In this post-Estelle case, an inmate 
was prevented from terminating her pregnancy by systemic procedural 
delays.61  Based on the principle that a serious medical need is “one that 
has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so 
obvious that a lay-person would easily recognize the necessity for a 
doctor’s attention,” the court held that the delay in access to abortion 
services constituted deliberate indifference to medical needs.62 
Other courts use the definition provided by the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in McGuckin v. Smith, where a prisoner 
brought suit after he failed to receive treatment for a massive herniation 
of his back for over three years. 63  The court held that a serious medical 
 58 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
 59 Id. at 103-04. 
 60 Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(“A medical need is serious . . . if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring 
treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a 
doctor’s attention.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 
390 F.3d 890, 896-97 (6th Cir. 2004) (same); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 
1996) (same); Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, Mass., 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990) 
(same). 
 61 Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates, 834 F.2d at 347. 
 62 Id. 
 63 McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992) (“A ‘serious’ medical need 
exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the 
‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’. . . .  The existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor 
or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical 
condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and 
substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a ‘serious’ need for medical 
treatment.”), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 
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need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in 
further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain.64  The prisoner’s condition was considered severe, and the court 
stated that “the woefully inadequate medical treatment” may well have 
been the basis for a valid § 1983 claim.65 
The second half of the Estelle test considers the culpable state of 
mind of the defendant prison official or doctor.66  The Supreme Court 
adopted the term “deliberate indifference” to classify the type of 
disregard or denial of serious medical needs, illness or injury of prisoners 
that violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment.67  The Court noted that acts or omissions by prison 
officials must be sufficiently harmful to show a deliberate indifference 
that offends the standards of decency.68  Lower courts uniformly 
interpreted “deliberate indifference” to be measured under a recklessness 
standard; however, a split arose over how recklessness was to be 
determined.  Some courts held that if the harm was sufficiently severe, 
such that it would be apparent to a reasonable person, then subjective 
knowledge could be imputed to the prison official.69  However, other 
courts held that the recklessness standard required knowledge of the 
severe condition and the appropriate means to treat the condition, and the 
1997); see also Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997); Chance v. Armstrong, 143 
F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998); Riddle, 83 F.3d at 1202. 
 64 McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60. 
 65 Id. at 1062-63.  The prisoner’s claim ultimately failed because he filed suit against a prison 
medical doctor and a private orthopedic specialist who were not responsible for his care until seven 
months before he had surgery, and nothing in the record indicated either named defendant had 
anything to do with delaying treatment.  Id. 
 66 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106-08 (1976). 
 67 Id. at 104-05 (“We therefore conclude that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs 
of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth 
Amendment.  This is true whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response 
to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical 
care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.  Regardless of how evidenced, 
deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of action under s 1983.” 
(citation and footnotes omitted)). 
 68 Id. at 106 (“Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely 
because the victim is a prisoner.  In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or 
omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.  It is 
only such indifference that can offend ‘evolving standards of decency’ in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.”). 
 69 Richardson v. Penfold, 839 F.2d 392, 395 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Similarly, a prison official who 
acts with deliberate or callous indifference toward inmates violates the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment.  A plaintiff can show deliberate indifference by proving that the prison 
official acted with actual intent or recklessness.  A defendant acts recklessly when he disregards a 
substantial risk of danger that either is known to him or would be apparent to a reasonable person in 
his position.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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refusal or prevention of treatment.70  In Farmer v. Brennan, the Supreme 
Court clarified that the recklessness standard is akin to criminal 
negligence, such that there must be actual, subjective awareness of the 
risk of harm.71 
After Turner, Estelle, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 
bringing a successful Eighth Amendment claim is more difficult: the 
available remedies are narrower, and the process of obtaining redress is 
more protracted. 72 
III.   PROGRESSION OF “DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE” ANALYSIS AND THE 
ABILITY OF PRISONERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS TO CHALLENGE THE 
CONDITIONS OF THEIR CONFINEMENT 
A.   EVOLUTION OF THE ESTELLE TEST 
Since Estelle, several Supreme Court cases have considered 
challenges to prison conditions and specific harmful acts under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.  These noteworthy cases explain the ongoing evolution of the 
criteria for “deliberate indifference” applied to prisoners’ Eighth 
Amendment challenges.73 
In Rhodes v. Chapman, an inmate challenged the practice of double-
celling inmates to handle overcrowded prisons and claimed this practice 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment.74  Although the Supreme 
Court held that the specific conditions in this particular prison did not 
rise to the level of a constitutional violation, the Court acknowledged that 
harsh conditions of confinement may constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment.75  Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion went into great 
detail about the sordid history of prison conditions and the essential role 
of judicial scrutiny to ameliorate the constitutional violations of such 
 70 LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535-36 (11th Cir. 1993) (“Because the Eighth 
Amendment requires a subjective standard, to demonstrate an official’s deliberate indifference, a 
plaintiff must prove that the official possessed knowledge both of the infirm condition and of the 
means to cure that condition, so that a conscious, culpable refusal to prevent the harm can be 
inferred from the defendant’s failure to prevent it.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 71 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1994). 
 72 See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
 73 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002); Farmer, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Helling v. McKinney, 
509 U.S. 25 (1993); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 
(1991); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986); Rhodes 
v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). 
 74 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 340. 
 75 Id. at 347. 
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conditions.76  Rhodes clarified that deliberate indifference could include 
a failure to address prison conditions.77  By recognizing that the Eighth 
Amendment covers more than specific harmful acts toward prisoners and 
may include prison conditions,78 the Court broadened the umbrella of the 
deliberate-indifference standard to encompass systemic conditions as 
well as practices. 
Similarly, in Wilson v. Seiter, a prisoner brought a § 1983 claim 
alleging Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations because the 
cumulative conditions of the prison79 constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment.80  The prisoner asserted that after he provided notice of the 
conditions to the defendants,81  they failed to take remedial action.82  The 
Court modified its holding in Rhodes and held that a challenge to prison 
conditions must prove a deprivation of a specific and identifiable human 
need.83 
The Wilson Court also addressed a question that had developed 
from its holding in Whitley v. Albers, in which an Eighth Amendment 
challenge was brought by a prisoner who was shot by a guard during an 
attempt to quell a disturbance.84  In Whitley, the Supreme Court focused 
on the culpability prong of the Estelle test rather than severity of the 
injury, by considering the situation the official faced when the injury 
occurred.85  The Court held that express intent to inflict pain is not 
required, but in a situation where prison officials are attempting to 
restore discipline, there must be a showing of bad faith or malicious 
conduct for the purpose of causing harm.86  The Wilson Court also 
clarified that the “obduracy, wantonness, or intent to cause harm” 
 76 Id. at 353-364 (Brennan, J, concurring). 
 77 Id. at 347 (majority opinion). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296 (1991).  The prisoner complained about overcrowding, 
excessive noise, inadequate heating and cooling, improper ventilation, unclean and inadequate 
restrooms, unsanitary dining facilities and food preparation, and housing physically and mentally ill 
inmates with the general prison population.  Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Defendants were the director of the Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections and the 
prison warden. 
 82 Wilson, 501 U.S. at 296. 
 83 Id. at 304. 
 84 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986). 
 85 Id. at 320-21. 
 86 Id. (“Where a prison security measure is undertaken to resolve a disturbance, such as 
occurred in this case, that indisputably poses significant risks to the safety of inmates and prison 
staff, we think the question whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and 
suffering ultimately turns on whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore 
discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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standard used in Whitley did not apply to prison condition cases, and the 
more lenient “deliberate indifference” standard was the proper standard 
to apply.87  Moreover, the Court clarified that a cruel-and-unusual-
punishment inquiry was not limited to the objective component, even 
though Rhodes turned on the objective portion of the inquiry.88  Thus, a 
court considering a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim must ask 
whether the alleged wrongdoing was objectively “harmful enough”89 to 
establish a constitutional violation, and whether “the officials act[ed] 
with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.”90 
The Court extended Whitley in the case Hudson v. McMillian, where 
an inmate brought an Eighth Amendment challenge claiming that a 
beating he received while in restraints constituted excessive force and 
cruel and unusual punishment.91  The Court held that if the injury was 
not severe, there could still be a viable Eighth Amendment challenge.92  
Distinguishing Whitley, in which the officials were attempting to quell a 
disturbance, the Hudson Court noted that the prisoner was restrained and 
there were no exigent circumstances requiring the restoration of order.93  
However, even using the Whitley standard would yield the same 
conclusion, because the objective component of the inquiry is contextual 
and responsive to contemporary standards of decency.94  “When prison 
officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, 
contemporary standards of decency always are violated,” regardless of 
the extent of injury sustained.95 
The harm element from the first prong of the Estelle test was 
broadened to include latent effects of prison conditions in Helling v. 
McKinney, in which a prisoner brought a challenge based on being 
subjected to second-hand tobacco smoke.96  The prisoner claimed that 
the prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the fact that they were 
jeopardizing his health, even though he had no current injury.97  The 
Court rejected the contention that only deliberate indifference to 
“current” serious health problems of inmates is actionable under the 
 87 Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302. 
 88 Id. at 298. 
 89 Id. at 303. 
 90 Id. at 298. 
 91 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992). 
 92 Id. at 7. 
 93 Id. at 6-7. 
 94 Id. at 7-8. 
 95 Id. at 9. 
 96 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 27 (1993).  The prisoner was assigned to a cell with 
another inmate who smoked five packs of cigarettes a day.  Id. 
 97 Id. at 27-28. 
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Eighth Amendment.98  Although the Court remanded to permit the 
inmate an opportunity to prove his claim, it noted that the objective and 
subjective components of deliberate indifference would be difficult to 
establish.99  If a person has been exposed to a risk of harm that she or he 
alleges is cruel and unusual punishment, the court must “assess whether 
society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave 
that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone 
unwillingly to such a risk.”100  For the subjective element, the Court 
noted that deliberate indifference “should be determined in light of the 
prison authorities’ current attitudes and conduct” to demonstrate that 
prison authorities are ignoring the possible dangers posed by a particular 
condition.101 
In Farmer v. Brennan, the Supreme Court resolved a conflict that 
had developed among the circuits when applying the deliberate-
indifference standard.102  A transwoman with breast implants and taking 
hormones was placed with the male general population, where she was 
allegedly raped and beaten in her cell by another inmate.103  She claimed 
that the officials were deliberately indifferent to her safety because of 
their knowledge that she would be particularly vulnerable to sexual 
attacks.104  The Court held that because the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
the infliction of cruel and unusual “punishment,” the classification of 
deliberate indifference necessitates a subjective standard in order to 
determine if an act or omission constitutes punishment.105  Although the 
Court acknowledged that being violently assaulted in prison is not “part 
of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against 
society,” without subjective knowledge (akin to criminal recklessness) 
there could not be a finding of deliberate indifference.106  The Court went 
on to explain that the culpability requirement necessitates that the official 
“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the 
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be 
 98 Id. at 34. 
 99 Id. at 36-37. 
 100 Id. at 36. 
 101 Id. at 36-37. 
 102 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); compare Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 
360-61 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding deliberate indifference occurs when an official “knows or should 
have known of a sufficiently serious danger to an inmate”), with McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 
344, 348 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that “deliberate indifference” requires a “subjective standard of 
recklessness”). 
 103 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829-31. 
 104 Id. at 831. 
 105 Id. at 837. 
 106 Id. at 834 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 
837. 
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drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also 
draw the inference.”107 
In Hope v. Pelzer, an inmate brought suit against prison guards, 
alleging that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated 
when he was handcuffed to a hitching post while in leg restraints and left 
there for several hours without regular water or bathroom breaks.108  The 
Court noted this was not an emergency situation, as in Whitley, and 
despite this, the prison officials “knowingly subjected him to a 
substantial risk of physical harm.”109  Applying the subjective standard 
elucidated in Farmer, the Court explained that “[w]e may infer the 
existence of this subjective state of mind from the fact that the risk of 
harm is obvious.”110  Unfortunately, the Court did not indicate why the 
facts were obvious and sufficient to establish subjective knowledge, a 
point noted by the dissenting opinion.111 
Through case law, the Supreme Court has clarified that a viable 
claim may be based on prison officials’ deliberate indifference to both 
current conditions of confinement and the risk of future harm.  However, 
because Farmer requires subjective knowledge of the condition or risk of 
harm, or harm so obvious that subjective knowledge can be imputed, 
persons with mental illness are rarely able to establish deliberate 
indifference despite the severity of their suffering.112 
B.   NECESSITY OF PROVIDING TREATMENT VERSUS RIGHT TO REFUSE 
TREATMENT 
In the 1970s, several lower courts held that prisons have a duty to 
provide access to psychiatric treatment.113  However, in the post-Farmer 
and post-Prison Litigation Reform Act era, few challenges have 
produced a vindication of rights for persons with mental illness.  
 107 Id. at 837. 
 108 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002). 
 109 Id. at 738. 
 110 Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). 
 111 Hope, 536 U.S. at 751 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“What is ‘obvious,’ however, is that the 
Court’s explanation of how respondents violated the Eighth Amendment is woefully incomplete.”). 
 112 See Lori A. Marschke, Comment, Proving Deliberate Indifference: Next to Impossible for 
Mentally Ill Inmates, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 487, 523-28 (2004). 
 113 See Horn v. Madison Cnty. Fiscal Court, 22 F.3d 653, 660 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(“[P]sychological needs may constitute serious medical needs.”); Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. 
Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) (finding that failure to provide necessary psychological 
treatment to inmates with serious mental or emotional disturbances states a claim of deliberate 
indifference); Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977) (stating that the law recognizes 
no distinction between physical and psychological medical services); see also Partridge v. Two 
Unknown Police Officers, 791 F.2d 1182, 1187 (5th Cir. 1986) (“A serious medical need may exist 
for psychological or psychiatric treatment, just as it may exist for physical ills.”). 
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Additionally, many courts struggle with problems that arise when an 
inmate with mental illness asserts the constitutional right to refuse 
treatment.114 
As high as the bar is for stating an Eighth Amendment claim based 
on improper medical care, the bar is even higher for persons with mental 
illness.115  There are no established criteria to determine what constitutes 
adequate mental health care, including mental health evaluations, which 
presents a significant difficulty in access to treatment.116  The Seventh 
Circuit determined that while measures such as professional health or 
suicide-risk evaluations after initial screening are desirable, they are not 
mandatory to establish constitutionally acceptable mental health care 
policies.117  As a result, access to a trained professional—who may be 
the only one to find that a serious mental health need is sufficiently 
obvious—is blocked because consistent requirements for regular 
evaluations have not been established. 
Moreover, there is a natural tension between providing inmates with 
their mental health needs and their right to refuse treatment.  Even when 
inmates have access to adequate care, often the result is to prescribe 
medications rather than to provide therapy or other forms of treatment.118  
Inmates have the right to refuse medications, but that right may be 
overcome (and medication forced) if there is a safety or security risk.119  
 114 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223 (1990). 
 115 See Marschke, Proving Deliberate Indifference: Next to Impossible for Mentally Ill 
Inmates, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. at 523-28. 
 116 Fred Cohen, Captives’ Legal Right to Mental Health Care, 17 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 8 
(1993) (“Without some anterior duty to diagnose—screen or classify are acceptable near-
synonyms—then the right to care is a virtual nullity.”). 
 117 See Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. Cnty. of Wood, 226 F.3d 525, 532 (7th Cir. 2000).  
But see Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1339 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on 
other grounds, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982) (outlining six requirements to meet the minimum 
standard of constitutionally adequate care as follows: (1) The prison must have a systematic program 
of screenings and evaluations of prisoners in order to identify those who need mental health 
treatment; (2) Treatment for a prisoner must entail more than just segregation and close supervision; 
(3) The prison must employ enough trained mental health professionals to be able to identify and 
treat those suffering from serious mental disorders the in an individualized manner; (4) Accurate, 
complete, and confidential records of the mental health treatment process must be maintained; (5) It 
is an unacceptable method of treatment to prescribe and administer “behavior-altering medications in 
dangerous amounts, by dangerous methods, or without acceptable supervision and periodic 
evaluation;” and (6) As a necessary component of any mental health treatment program, the prison 
must have a basic program for the identification, treatment, and supervision of suicidal prisoners). 
 118 See DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH 
PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1, 8-9 (2006), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. 
PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 1, 115-17 (2003), available at 
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa1003.pdf. 
 119 Compare Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990), with Turner v. 
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223 (1990). 
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In Washington v. Harper, the Court concluded that when safety or 
security is in jeopardy, a state law authorizing involuntary treatment 
amounted to a constitutionally permissible “accommodation between an 
inmate’s liberty interest in avoiding the forced administration of 
antipsychotic drugs and the State’s interests in providing appropriate 
medical treatment to reduce the danger that an inmate suffering from a 
serious mental disorder represents to himself or others.”120  In Riggins v. 
Nevada, the Court repeated that an individual has a constitutionally 
protected liberty “interest in avoiding involuntary administration of 
antipsychotic drugs,” which only an “essential” or “overriding” state 
interest might overcome.121 
Although the Supreme Court has consistently held that prison 
officials may forcibly treat a mentally ill inmate with antipsychotic drugs 
only when “the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the 
treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest,”122 the Court’s holding in 
Sell v. United States clarifies the procedural safeguards that balance 
competing interests between the state and the inmate when danger to self 
or others is not the case.123  In Sell, the Court revisited the issue of a 
person’s right to refuse treatment while in custody and when that right 
must yield.124  Mr. Sell was ordered by the magistrate to be hospitalized 
for treatment after a competency hearing that resulted in a finding that 
Sell was “mentally incompetent to stand trial.”125  The purpose of the 
treatment was to determine whether there was a substantial probability 
that Sell would attain the capacity for his trial to proceed.126  While in 
custody, the medical center staff recommended that Sell take 
antipsychotic medication but he refused.127  Medical center authorities 
decided to allow involuntary medication, which Sell challenged in 
court.128  The Court held that when an inmate does not pose a danger, the 
right to refuse treatment provides significant protections; the Court 
established the following guidelines: 
First, a court must find that important governmental interests are at 
stake. . . .  Second, the court must conclude that involuntary 
medication will significantly further those concomitant state 
 120 Harper, 494 U.S. at 236. 
 121 Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134, 135 (1992). 
 122 Harper, 494 U.S. at 227. 
 123 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 169 (2003). 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at 171. 
 126 Id. at 170-71. 
 127 Id. at 171. 
 128 Id. at 172. 
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interests. . . .  Third, the court must conclude that involuntary 
medication is necessary to further those interests. The court must find 
that any alternative, less intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve 
substantially the same results. . . .  Fourth, as we have said, the court 
must conclude that administration of the drugs is medically 
appropriate, i.e., in the patient’s best medical interest in light of his 
medical condition.  The specific kinds of drugs at issue may matter 
here as elsewhere.  Different kinds of antipsychotic drugs may 
produce different side effects and enjoy different levels of success.129 
The Court distinguished between when it is justifiable to involuntarily 
medicate for purposes related to the inmate’s dangerousness and when 
refusal to take drugs puts the inmate’s health gravely at risk.130 
However, the Court recently denied certiorari for an inmate who 
claimed prison officials imposed sanctions because he refused his HIV 
medications in protest against being transferred to a particular prison 
facility.131  Subsequently, he was subjected to hard labor in 100-degree 
heat despite repeated requests for lighter duty more appropriate 
considering his medical condition.132  Thus, the question remains 
unresolved whether there can be an Eighth Amendment challenge for 
punitive reactions to prisoners refusing treatment.133 
For persons with mental illness, much of the care is dependent on an 
accurate diagnosis, but symptoms may present differently at times, and 
many diagnoses have similar or overlapping features with other 
diagnoses.134  Furthermore, persons with mental illness often have 
varying diagnoses from different clinical providers.135  However, 
clinicians who are trained in recognizing and diagnosing mental illness 
are better able to identify signs and symptoms that require acute care.136  
Unlike prison officials who have no diagnostic training, medical 
professionals would have the requisite knowledge to satisfy the 
subjective prong of the deliberate-indifference test. 
 129 Id. at 180-81. 
 130 Id. at 181-82. 
 131 Pitre v. Cain, 131 S. Ct. 8 (2010). 
 132 Id. at 8 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 133 See id. at 9. 
 134 M. Katherine Shear et al., Diagnosis of Nonpsychotic Patients in Community Clinics, 157 
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 581, 581-87 (2000); see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND 
STATISTICAL MANUAL (4th ed. 2000). 
 135 Shear et al., Diagnosis of Nonpsychotic Patients in Community Clinics, 157 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY at 581. 
 136 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL 
ILLNESS 1, 103 (2003), available at www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa1003.pdf. 
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If an inmate cannot rely on diagnosis or treatment because she or he 
lacks access to mental health professionals, the only option remaining to 
prove deliberate indifference is to establish that the suffering is so 
obvious a reasonable person could easily recognize the need for medical 
attention.137  Unfortunately, for persons with mental illness, there may be 
no easily discernible symptom for the layperson to recognize even when 
the internal suffering is quite severe.138  Given the difficulty for an 
untrained person to detect mental illness, as compared to a physical 
illness, a court may determine that a prison official is not deliberately 
indifferent to a prisoner’s serious mental health need because that need is 
not sufficiently obvious to the prison official.139  Additionally, prison 
security personnel would not easily detect mental illness because they are 
not adequately trained to recognize the symptoms that require psychiatric 
care.140  The result of this inability of prison officials to detect mental 
suffering is that inmates may have severe suffering without the ability to 
prove deliberate indifference. 
C.   IMPACT OF FARMER’S SUBJECTIVE STANDARD ON THE OPERATION 
OF PRISONS 
The Supreme Court in Farmer indicated that it was not concerned 
that the subjective standard would promote indifference to the health and 
safety needs of inmates.141  However, since Farmer, very few prison 
officials have been held liable under § 1983 despite deplorable 
conditions and treatment.142  This result raises the question: Does 
Farmer’s subjective standard promote indifference?143  Several scholars 
who have addressed this question recommend abandoning Farmer’s 
 137 See Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, Mass., 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 138 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH 
MENTAL ILLNESS at 75-76. 
 139 See Christy P. Johnson, Mental Health Care Policies in Jail Systems: Suicide and the 
Eighth Amendment, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1227, 1251 (2002) (“Courts may reason that, because 
mental illness affects the mind rather than the body, a layperson may not be able to identify a mental 
illness.”). 
 140 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL 
ILLNESS at 76; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 110 n.3 (1976). 
 141 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994) (“We doubt that a subjective approach will 
present prison officials with any serious motivation to take refuge in the zone between ignorance of 
obvious risks and actual knowledge of risks.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 142 See STOP PRISONER RAPE, IN THE SHADOWS: SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN U.S. DETENTION 
FACILITIES, A SHADOW REPORT TO THE U.N. COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE 1, 19 (2006), 
available at www.justdetention.org/pdf/in_the_shadows.pdf (“[T]he standard established under 
Farmer v. Brennan is so difficult to meet that few plaintiffs have been successful.”). 
 143 See id. (stating that Farmer’s subjective “standard also creates a perverse incentive for 
prison officials to deliberately ignore what is happening in their facilities”). 
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subjective standard in favor of an objective standard.144  However, this 
proposal is unworkable for persons with mental illness, because clinical 
assessment is subjective.  The very issues that make deliberate 
indifference difficult to prove under a subjective standard will not be 
alleviated for persons with mental illness by using an objective standard.  
There are great discrepancies among clinicians in assessment and 
diagnoses, because the mental health assessment includes current 
symptoms that manifest differently for different people.145  Therefore, an 
objective standard of what a reasonable person would do is, in effect, 
more difficult to apply than a subjective standard of what was actually 
known. 
However, despite the rational justification for a subjective standard 
to determine deliberate indifference, in practice, prison officials 
untrained in mental assessments must decide whom to refer to 
clinicians.146  For the subjective standard of Farmer to have some 
practical meaning as it relates to persons with mental illness, there must 
be some mechanism in place to ensure access to treatment.  Necessity of 
medical treatment can best be determined by medical professionals, not 
prison officials.  Given that the nature of confinement prevents inmates 
from caring for themselves, and that prison officials cannot be 
deliberately indifferent to mental conditions they cannot detect, prison 
staff needs to be adequately trained to recognize symptoms that require 
referral for psychiatric treatment.147 
 144 See, e.g., Katherine Robb, What We Don’t Know Might Hurt Us: Subjective Knowledge 
and the Eighth Amendment’s Deliberate Indifference Standard for Sexual Abuse in Prisons, 65 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 705, 711-15 (2010); Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and 
the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 948-54 (2009); Lori A. Marschke, Comment, 
Proving Deliberate Indifference: Next to Impossible for Mentally Ill Inmates, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 
487, 528-32 (2004). 
 145 PAULA T. TRZEPACZ & ROBERT W. BAKER, THE PSYCHIATRIC MENTAL STATUS 
EXAMINATION (1993). 
 146 See Marschke, Proving Deliberate Indifference: Next to Impossible for Mentally Ill 
Inmates, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. at 523; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 110 n.3 (1976) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“When ill, the prisoner’s point of contact with a prison’s health care 
program is the sick-call line.  Access may be barred by a guard, who refuses to give the convict a 
hospital pass out of whimsy or prejudice, or in light of a history of undiagnosed complaints.”) 
(quoting Health Law Project, Univ. of Pa., Health Care and Conditions in Pa’s State Prisons, in AM. 
BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON CORR. FACILITIES AND SERVS., MEDICAL AND HEALTH CARE IN JAILS, 
PRISONS, AND OTHER CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES: A COMPILATION OF STANDARDS AND MATERIALS 
71, 81-82 (1974)). 
 147 See HOLLY HILLS ET AL., NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, EFFECTIVE PRISON 
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES: GUIDELINES TO EXPAND AND IMPROVE TREATMENT 6 (2004), 
available at http://static.nicic.gov/Library/018604.pdf (“Illnesses such as schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective disorder, and major depression may affect inmates’ ability to care for themselves and 
to comply with certain orders or procedures.  People with major depression or bipolar disorder may 
exhibit aggression or irritability.  Paranoia may result in an inmate’s failure to relate well to others.  
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IV.   PROPOSAL TO AMELIORATE BARRIERS PERSONS WITH MENTAL 
ILLNESS FACE IN REDRESSING SEVERE AND UNTREATED MENTAL 
SUFFERING WHILE IN CUSTODY 
A.   TRACKING MENTAL HEALTH 
From the initial interaction with police prior to arrest through entry 
into prison custody, there are numerous opportunities to identify 
behavior that is indicative of mental illness.  Often, police make a field 
assessment at the time of the arrest that indicates the presence of 
symptoms of mental health problems.148  Some police, trained to provide 
crisis intervention services, act as liaisons with local mental health 
services rather than making arrests.  This process is known as 
diversion.149  Additionally, many states authorize pre-arraignment mental 
health examinations to determine if diversion is preferable.150  Once a 
person is in police custody, for the purposes of arraignment, the 
magistrate may consider the person’s mental health when determining 
bail.151  Individuals in jail awaiting trial may exhibit signs of mental 
illness after confinement.  Mental health assessments can also occur 
before trial when either the prosecutor or defense attorney requests a 
competency hearing.152  During trial, mental health may be used to argue 
insufficient culpability, as an affirmative defense, and as mitigating 
evidence at the sentencing phase.153  Thus, throughout the procedural 
phases of a criminal case, an individual’s mental health problems can be, 
People with schizophrenia may hear voices and have other problems that interfere with their ability 
to follow directions and behave as expected.  In addition, mental illness can evoke fears, hostile 
reactions, and negative responses from other inmates and staff.  Several studies describe inmates 
with mental disorders as having a disruptive effect in a prison environment.”). 
 148 See MELISSA REULAND & JASON CHENEY, GAINS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE & POLICY 
ANALYSIS CTR. FOR JAIL DIVERSION, ENHANCING SUCCESS OF POLICE-BASED DIVERSION 
PROGRAMS FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS (2005), available at 
www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=cit2&template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&
ContentID=65062; Henry J. Steadman et al., A National Survey of Jail Diversion Programs for 
Mentally Ill Detainees, 45 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1109, 1109-13 (1994). 
 149 Officers divert offenders with mental illness from the criminal justice system to 
community-based treatment.  See REULAND & CHENEY, ENHANCING SUCCESS OF POLICE-BASED 
DIVERSION PROGRAMS FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS at 33. 
 150 Rick Ruddell, Jail Interventions for Inmates with Mental Illnesses, 12 J. CORRECTIONAL 
HEALTH CARE 118, 118-31 (2006). 
 151 Amy Watson et al., Mental Health Courts and the Complex Issue of Mentally Ill 
Offenders, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 477, 477-81 (2001). 
 152 NORMAN POYTHRESS JR. ET AL., 15 ADJUDICATIVE COMPETENCE: THE MACARTHUR 
STUDIES (2002). 
 153 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 et seq. 
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and often are, identified, and this information should be passed on to 
prison officials. 
A formal mechanism should be established to ensure that all 
information relating to an inmate’s mental health is collected and 
transmitted to the prison.  Whenever mental health problems have been 
observed prior to or upon entry into prison custody, the inmate should be 
provided a mandatory comprehensive psychiatric evaluation by a 
psychiatrist, psychologist, or licensed clinician.  The evaluator should 
have access to all records and reports produced by law enforcement and 
court-ordered evaluations, as well as any relevant prior medical 
records.154  As part of the evaluation, the clinician must create a 
treatment program and notify prison staff of particular symptoms that 
indicate need for immediate treatment.  Additionally, medical staff must 
regularly monitor individuals with mental health problems to ensure the 
treatment provided is adequate and effective.  Medical staff should also 
provide prison officials with information related to the side effects of 
medication and symptoms of medicine toxicity. 
B.   MANDATORY AND UNIFORM TRAINING FOR PRISON STAFF 
In order for treatment to be both available to and beneficial for 
persons with mental illness in custody, prison staff must be trained to 
identify symptoms that require acute care.  Additionally, in cases in 
which symptoms of mental illness are not observed prior to entry into 
 154 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–191, 110 
Stat. 1936.  45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (Westlaw 2012) is implicated by disclosure of medical information 
(by a health plan, a health-care clearinghouse or a health-care provider who transmits any health 
information in electronic form in connection with a covered transaction); however, 45 C.F.R. § 
164.512(e), (f), (j), and (k) provide that disclosures to certain law enforcement officials, courts, and 
government agencies may be permissible.  45 C.F.R. § 164.512(k)(5) in particular permits 
disclosures to correctional institutions and in other law enforcement custodial situations.  45 C.F.R. § 
164.512 (k)(5) provides: 
(i) Permitted disclosures. A covered entity may disclose to a correctional institution or a law 
enforcement official having lawful custody of an inmate or other individual protected health 
information about such inmate or individual, if the correctional institution or such law 
enforcement official represents that such protected health information is necessary for: (A) 
The provision of health care to such individuals; (B) The health and safety of such individual 
or other inmates; (C) The health and safety of the officers or employees of or others at the 
correctional institution; (D) The health and safety of such individuals and officers or other 
persons responsible for the transporting of inmates or their transfer from one institution, 
facility, or setting to another; (E) Law enforcement on the premises of the correctional 
institution; and (F) The administration and maintenance of the safety, security, and good 
order of the correctional institution. (ii) Permitted uses. A covered entity that is a correctional 
institution may use protected health information of individuals who are inmates for any 
purpose for which such protected health information may be disclosed. 
45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (k)(5) (Westlaw 2012). 
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custody but emerge after a period of time in prison, staff must have 
sufficient training to identify symptoms and facilitate referrals for 
appropriate evaluations and necessary treatment.  Because prison 
officials observe and monitor prisoners for security purposes, these 
officials have been termed the “gate-keepers” for inmate access to mental 
health services.155  Inmates may not be granted access to necessary 
treatment if the officials do not recognize the need.156  Currently, there 
are no uniform mandatory minimum requirements for mental illness 
training throughout the prison system, and the result is inconsistent and 
ineffective training.157  A national training standard or certification 
requirement is needed for all prison officials who interact with the prison 
population.158 
The training required should be designed to provide officials with 
sufficient knowledge of mental illness so that the subjective standard of 
Farmer has practical meaning as it relates to persons with mental illness.  
The minimum standard for all prison staff should include training on 
psychosis, recognizing signs of mental illness in younger prisoners 
ranging in age from eighteen to twenty-five,159 and recognizing 
 155 See Lori A. Marschke, Comment, Proving Deliberate Indifference: Next to Impossible for 
Mentally Ill Inmates, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 487, 523 (2004); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 
110 n.3 (1976). 
 156 See Marschke, Proving Deliberate Indifference: Next to Impossible for Mentally Ill 
Inmates, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. at 536-39. 
 157 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH 
MENTAL ILLNESS 1, 76 (2003), available at www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa1003.pdf.  
Currently, mental-health training for security staff is lacking in many states, and in 2001, ten states 
reported not providing any training at all.  A 2001 report by the National Institute of Corrections 
revealed that “[t]en prison systems claimed to include roughly four hours of mental health classes in 
their basic training package for new correctional officers, thirteen admitted to providing fewer than 
four hours, and only seven stated that they provided more than four hours of training.”  NATIONAL 
INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, PROVISION OF MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN PRISONS 9 (2001), available 
at http://static.nicic.gov/Library/016724.pdf; see also MIKI VOHRYZEK-BOLDEN, OVERVIEW OF 
SELECTED STATES’ ACADEMY AND IN-SERVICE TRAINING FOR ADULT AND JUVENILE 
CORRECTIONAL EMPLOYEES 53-61, tbl.9a (1999).  California provides a three-hour course on 
“unusual inmate behavior.”  No other state reported a similar course.  Ohio and Tennessee each 
offered a course, lasting two and three hours, respectively, titled “managing manipulative inmate 
behavior.”  Arizona, Nebraska, and Nevada provided officers with a course titled “con games.”  
Tennessee offered a three and a half-hour course in “psychological testing.”  Under courses on 
health and welfare, only eight states—Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Michigan, New Mexico, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and Utah—offered courses specifically on “mental health issues/special needs 
inmates.”  Aside from Michigan offering sixteen hours of training in this area, all other states ranged 
from between one hour and forty-five minutes to six hours. 
 158 See, e.g., the National Institute of Corrections website, http://nicic.gov/AboutTraining, for 
training opportunities for local, state and federal corrections staff. 
 159 For the majority of mental illnesses, onset occurs between the ages of eighteen and twenty-
five.  See  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL (4th ed. 2000). 
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symptoms of emergent mental distress among prisoners not previously 
identified as mentally ill. 
C.   MANDATORY REFERRALS 
Whenever an inmate shows symptoms of mental distress, prison 
officials should be required to automatically refer the inmate to a trained 
clinician.  Mandatory referrals would remove the need for prison 
officials to make assessments themselves and would safeguard and 
insulate officials from liability for deliberate-indifference claims.  Prison 
officials would be subjected to the possibility of liability only if they 
refuse to comply with the mandatory referral protocol.  Clinicians would 
be able to make appropriate assessments, including testing for 
malingering,160 and to provide treatment plans that serve the needs of the 
inmates.  Mandatory referrals also would safeguard inmates’ right to 
refuse treatment.  If an inmate refuses medication, the clinician can make 
the assessment of whether the inmate poses a danger to himself or others.  
When an inmate does not pose a threat the clinician must comply with 
the criteria set forth in Sell.161  By following mandatory referral 
protocols, prison officials would be safeguarded from liability, and 
inmates would be provided constitutional protections.  Medical staff 
would be fully empowered to assess medical necessity, and prison 
officials would be able to maintain order without fear of exposing 
themselves to liability. 
CONCLUSION 
The number of persons with mental health problems in prisons and 
jails is staggering.  Penal institutions have become de facto institutions 
for the treatment of persons with mental illness.162  Whenever an 
individual is deprived of liberty by the state and can no longer provide 
for his or her own basic needs, the state is obligated to provide necessary 
care.  For persons with mental illness, basic care includes access to 
mental health treatment.  Because failing to provide necessary care 
violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth 
 160 Malingering is the intentional fabrication or gross exaggeration of physical or 
psychological symptoms in an effort to achieve a goal or avoid a punishment.  See id. 
 161 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180-81 (2003). 
 162 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH 
MENTAL ILLNESS 1 (2003), available at www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa1003.pdf (“In the 
United States, there are three times more mentally ill people in prisons than in mental health 
hospitals, and prisoners have rates of mental illness that are two to four times greater than the rates 
of members of the general public.”). 
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Amendment, there must be mechanisms in place to ensure that adequate 
treatment is provided while protecting individual rights. 
The Supreme Court has determined that proof of a deprivation of a 
constitutional right resulting from deliberate indifference to a serious 
medical need requires a subjective awareness of the risk of harm.163  In 
order for this subjective standard to have any practical meaning for 
persons with mental illness, there must be mandatory psychiatric 
evaluations for inmates with a history of mental illness and appropriate 
treatment programs designed to accommodate their medical condition.  
Prison officials should be provided standardized training in psychosis, 
should be provided necessary information from clinical staff about side 
effects of individual treatment programs, and should automatically refer 
any inmate exhibiting signs of mental distress for clinical assessment and 
treatment.  These proposals would ensure inmates access to treatment 
while protecting their right to refuse treatment.  Making referral 
mandatory would relieve prison officials from making pseudo-clinical 
assessments to determine if referral is necessary and protect the safety of 
both inmates and prison officials.  Unless an official fails to make the 
mandatory referral, she or he will have provided access to treatment, 
thereby establishing affirmative proof that she or he is not indifferent to a 
serious medical need.  Ultimately, these proposed changes would protect 
persons with mental illness from cruel and unusual punishment by 
establishing procedures to mitigate the invisibility of their illness while 
insulating prison officials from liability on inmate claims of deliberate 
indifference.  Increasing access to diagnosis and treatment would 
diminish unintended suffering.  As a final protective mechanism, if a 
person in custody needs to seek redress from the courts, these proposals 
would reduce some of the barriers that inmates with mental illness face 
in challenging constitutional violations. 
 163 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 826 (1994). 
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